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Abstract—Physical-layer security has drawn ever-
increasing attention in the next generation wireless commu-
nications. In this paper, we focus on studying the secure
communication in an HPN-to-devices (HTD) network, in
which a new type of MAC spoofing attack is considered.
To detect the malicious attack, we propose a novel algo-
rithm, namely, eigenvalue test using random matrix theory
(ETRMT) algorithm, which needs no prior information
about the channel. In particular, when the number of
samples is finite at the receiver or the number of devices
is large, the sampled signal is the biased estimation of
the actual signal, which inspires us to use the random
matrix theory to analyze the spoofing attack detection. The
closed-form expressions of the detection probability, the
false alarm probability, and the Neyman-Pearson threshold
are derived based on eigenvalue distribution of the spiked
population model. In addition, taking the channel time-
varying into consideration, we provide an adaptive thresh-
old tracking method by using Bayesian forecasting. Finally,
the simulations are conducted to validate our proposed
method and some insightful conclusions are obtained.
Index Terms—Active MAC spoofing attack detection,
random matrix theory, Bayesian forecasting.
I. INTRODUCTION
Thanks to the next generation wireless communica-
tions, the high-speed data communication is gradually
becoming reality. However, owing to the broadcast na-
ture of wireless communications, they are vulnerable
to MAC spoofing attack, in which the spoofer claims
himself as a legitimate user by eavesdropping and then
modify its MAC address to legitimate user’s. Because
of the management and control frame are usually not
protected in existing security techniques [1], such attack
can further launch significant denial of service (DoS) or
man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack.
Many previous work exploited the physical layer char-
acteristics derived from intrinsic channel randomness to
verify the identities of terminals. received signal strength
indicator (RSSI) [2], [3], channel state information (CSI)
[4], [5], channel impulse response (CIR) [6]–[8] have
been widely used. However, reference [9] shown that
the intrinsic channel randomness is time-varying, i.e.,
doppler frequency shift, location, scattered multi-path
environment etc, thus, limits the design of physical-layer
(PHY-layer) security. With the consideration of channel
time-varying, many related work has been explored. In
[10], the authors modeled the variable part of the channel
response as a wide sense stationary uncorrelated scatter-
ing process and utilized an autoregressive model of order
1 to characterize the temporal process. Game theory and
Q-learning based authentication was proposed in [8] to
determine the optimal threshold for spoofer detection in
a dynamic unknown channel model. In addition, the au-
thors proposed a logistic regression based authentication
to remove the assumption on the known channel model
and used a distributed Frank-Wolfe based authentication
method to reduce the communication overhead in [3]. In
light of the aforementioned work, some intense interests
mainly focused on time-varying channel spoofing attack
detection. However, there are still some urgent problems
need to be solved. The main motivations of this paper
are based on the following considerations:
1) Most of existence work only consider the passive
MAC spoofing attack which launches when trans-
mitter is in idle state, and they have to store the
genuine user’s PHY-layer fingerprint in the off-line
phase, i.e., [3]–[5], [8], [10].
2) The prior channel information is needed, which
introduces a high overhead and estimation error.
If the attacker mimics the legitimate channel in-
formation (no spatial diversity), many landmark
methods may not work well, i.e., [4]–[8].
In this paper, we study the multi-user cooperative
detection for active MAC spoofing attack in an HPN-to-
devices (HTD) network, and the channel time-varying is
considered. In this attack, the attacker eavesdrops the
legitimate channels information and MAC address in
HTD uplink transmission, and then fabricating both of
them in HTD downlink transmission. In this case, if the
forged management or control frame signal (aliased as
control signal) and legitimate control signal are trans-
mitted synchronously and the transmission power of the
forged one is higher than the legitimate one, then the
receivers would accept the spoofing codewords and reject
the HPN’s codewords [11]. Hence, such attacker is more
of threat to the network services than passive spoofer,
i.e., availability refers to communication continuity and
timeliness, besides launching DoS or MITM attack. It
becomes even more worse, specifically in multiple access
systems, i.e., non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA)
system. Due to all the serious damages this attack could
cause, first of all, it is important for the user to be able to
detect it. In general, the design for the above stated active
spoofing attack and its detection approach are non-trivial,
the main contributions of this work are summarized as
follows
• Unlike the passive MAC spoofing attack detec-
tion, we propose an eigenvalue test using random
matrix theory (ETRMT) algorithm to cooperative
detect active MAC spoofing attack. Our proposed
ETRMT algorithm is a “location freely” and “on-
line” method, which needs no prior information
about the channel and do not have to store any PHY-
layer fingerprint in the off-line phase.
• Different from existing energy detection based
methods [2], [3], we consider the impact of estima-
tion error caused by finite number of samples and
use the RMT to compensate this error. The closed-
form expressions of detection probability and false
alarm probability are derived. We prove the mini-
mum eigenvalue distribution with the presence of
signals. The adaptive threshold tracking method is
proposed using Bayesian forecasting.
• The proposed cooperative detection algorithm can
detect the attacker in a pure PHY-layer approach
(relative to cross-layer security design means),
which makes the mobile device save a large amount
of time and overhead. In addition, this method
requires no modification to the current transmit-
receive structure and can be integrated with tradi-
tional authentication mechanisms to enhance wire-
less communication security.
Notation: Boldface uppercase and lowercase letters
denote matrix and vector, such as A and a, respectively.
A
⊤ and A† represent transpose and conjugate transpose,
respectively. IM is the identity matrix of order M ×M
and RA is the covariance matrix of matrix A. E[·] is the
expectation operator. Cm×n denotes the complex space
of order m× n.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Attack Model
We consider a PHY-layer active MAC spoofing attack
that the malicious spoofer can eavesdrop the legitimate
channels information and HPN’s MAC address in up-
link orthogonal channels, i.e., the attacker deploys a
“helper node” who stays close to the receiver to pas-
sive eavesdropping the reverse training phase [12], then
attacker emulates the legitimate channels information
and transmits the deceiving signal, i.e., the illegitimate
control signal, using HPN’s MAC address in downlink
transmission1. We assume that the spoofer and HPN
are separated by a reasonable security distance and can
emulate the legitimate channels (compensate channel
differences) by equipping a circular smart antennas array
to design signal precode [13].
B. Network Model
We assume that the network consists of one location
fixed HPN, M free moving devices, one fusion center
(FC), all of them are equipped with single antenna. In
addition, one location free spoofer are equipped with
a smart antenna array and uses a low power single
antenna helper node to eavesdropping and transmission.
Let b denote the HPN, m ∈ {1, · · · ,M} denote the
m-th device, and s denote the spoofer. Let x(t) be the
time continuous downlink frame signal with bandwidth
W , the sampling rate is fs ≥ W , and the sampling
period is Ts = 1/fs. For the Ns samples of signal
x(t), we write it as x = {xnsTs |ns = 1, · · · , Ns}. The
channel between transmitter and the m-th receiver is
reciprocal and orthogonal, which is defined as htm =√
d−ηtm h˜tm, where dtm represents the distance between
transmitter and the m-th receiver, η is the path loss
exponent and h˜tm represents small-scale fading follows
zero-mean complex Gaussian processes of unit-variance.
Specifically, we treat htm as a wide sense stationary
uncorrelated scattering process with the classical Jakes’
power spectrum of maximum Doppler frequency fd and
the channel is time-varying but correlated between the
time t and the next time t+ T . In addition, during time
slot T , we assume the channel is quasi-static. To this
end, we model the channel as an autoregressive of order
1 random process follows
htm(t+ T ) = ρhtm(t) + u(t), (1)
where ρ is the correlation coefficient of the time-varying
channel with respect to the zero-th order Bessel function
of the first kind and u(t) is independent of the channel
htm(t), following zero-mean complex Gaussian distri-
bution with variance 1 − ρ2. For all devices M , the
N samples of the received signal in downlink can be






where Y ∈ CM×Ns (Ns ≫ M ), Pb,Ps (Pb < Ps)
are the power budget of HPN and spoofer, hbd,hsd ∈
1Each receiver knows the normal signal power by estimating using
HTD uplink, i.e., reverse training, and the attacker knows the legitimate
channels information by eavesdropping HTD uplink.
2Note that this argument assumes perfect synchronization of HPN
and spoofer’s transmissions when Φ = 1.
C
M×1, x⊤b ∈ CNs×1 is the sampled unit-energy gen-
uine control signal, xps
⊤ ∈ CNs×1 is the sampled
illegitimate control signal with precode, i.e., the spoofer
sends xps(t) = wmxs(t) to the m-th device via precode
h
⊤
sdwm = hmb, N ∈ CM×Ns is independent of signal,
each term is i.i.d. complex Gaussian random variable
with zero-mean and variance σ2, and Φ = 1 or Φ = 0
represents the active spoofer is present or absent.
III. COOPERATIVE PHY-LAYER SPOOFING
DETECTION
According to (2), when the spoofer is present (Φ = 1),
the spoofer and the HPN are co-existence. Hence, the
control signals are underlay and the power is obviously
larger than normal (no attack). The larger the signal
power is, the higher risk the attacker will be detected.
Hence, we use this interesting phenomenon to detect the
active attacker. Since the channel and the noise variance
are time-varying, the samples are finite, which make
channel information difficult to estimate accurately, thus,
we propose the ETRMT algorithm.
A. Eigenvalue Test Using Random Matrix Theory
After broadcasting the control signal, each device
transmits Ns samples of the received control signal to




Since signal covariance matrix is full-rank, the sample






IM + diag(λ0, · · · , λm, 0 · · · , 0),
where E is the eigenvector matrix corresponding to the
eigenvalue matrix. Let λ0 ≥ · · · ≥ λm denote the eigen-
values in the descending order, we find that the signal
power is almost concentrated on λmax(RY(Ns)) = λ0
and the noise power can be estimated by the minimum
eigenvalue λmin(RY(Ns)) = σ
2. We use the maximum
eigenvalue ratio the minimum eigenvalue to detect the
spoofer’s state. The cooperative spoofing attack detection







Where H0 indicates the attacker is absent and H1
indicates the attacker is present. If the test statistic is less
than a threshold γ, which is derived from the statistic
of the initial normal signal, the device accepts H0.
Otherwise, the device accepts H1.
However, the number of samples is finite in practice,
the sample covariance matrix RY(Ns) is the biased
estimate of the statistical covariance matrix RY. Let us
rewrite (2) with Φ = 0 as
Y =






xb,1 · · · xb,Ns
n1 · · · nNs
...
...
n1 · · · nNs

where hb,m ,
√Pbhbm represents the channel of the
m-th device, and nk is the noise with unit variance at
sample k. Note that TbT
†
b has clearly one eigenvalue
ρb,0 =
∑M
m=1 |hb,m|2 + σ2 and the rest eigenvalues
are σ2. It inspires us to analyze the behavior of the
eigenvalue of RY(Ns) using random matrix theory. This
behavior is related to the eigenvalue of large sample
covariance matrix of spiked population model Tb [14].
In the following, the symbol
∑M
m=1 is omitted to
∑
and
λmax(RY(Ns)) to λmax, if no confusion occurs.
Theorem 1: Let RY(Ns) denote the sample covariance
matrix of Ns samples with a single signal of strength∑ |hb,m|2 from (2) (Φ = 0). Then, if Ns,M →∞, with
M
Ns









∑ |hb,m|2 ) (5)
Similarly, we rewrite (2) with Φ = 1 as
Y =
 hb,1 hs,1 σ 0... ... . . .





xb,1 · · · xb,Ns
xs,1 · · · xs,Ns
n1 · · · nNs
...
...
n1 · · · nNs

where hs,m ,
√Pshsm represents the m-th forged chan-
nel. If the eigenvalues are arranged in the descending
order, we find TsT
†
s has two eigenvalues ρs,0 ≥ ρs,1,
and the rest eigenvalues are σ2. The following theorem
describes the behavior of the largest eigenvalue λs,max
of RY(Ns), i.e., (2) with Φ = 1, with K sufficiently
strong signals, i.e., ρs,0 − σ2 > σ2(MNs )1/2 [16].
Theorem 2: Let RY(Ns) denote the sample covariance
matrix of Ns samples from (2) (Φ = 1) with K signals.
Then, if Ns,M → ∞, with MNs fixed, the eigenvalue









, k = 0, · · · ,K − 1;
σ2[1 + (MNs )
1/2]2, otherwise.





Ns (ρs,0 − σ2)
)
. (6)
Corollary 1: Assuming each term hb,m with respect
to channel vector hbd is an i.i.d complex random process
with zero-mean and variance σ2b . Then, when Ns,M





M can converge w.p.1 to a Gaussian
distribution with mean µ∞ = σ
2





for complex random variable.














[|hb,m|4 − σ4b ] . (7)
For complex random variable hb,m = hr + jhj with


















= 2σ4b . (8)
Substituting (8) into (7), the proof is completed.
When the terms of Y are zero-mean i.i.d. Gaussian
noise, RY is commonly referred to as a Wishart random
matrix [14]. However, the matrix form of (2) is no longer
a Wishart random matrix, which is difficult to obtain the
eigenvalue distribution of λmin. To solve it, we prove
the theorem 3.
Theorem 3: Let λ′min =
Ns
σ2 λmin denote the min-
imum eigenvalue of the normalized statistical covari-
ance matrix. For a setting with K signals (sufficiently





to the Tracy-Widom distribution of order 2 [17], with
µK = (N
1/2
s − (M −K)1/2)2, φK = ((M −K)1/2 −
N
1/2
s )((M −K)−1/2 −N−1/2s )1/3.
Proof: See Appendix A for details.
B. Detection Probability and False Alarm Probability
Since the finite number of samples and time-vary
noise, observation will exist estimation error, which lead
to imperfect detection. We estimate the performance of
our proposed ETRMT method by detection probability
and false alarm probability. That is, if a spoofer is ob-
served, while the actual state is null (spoofer is absent),
we say a false alarm occurs and denote this probability
as Pf , otherwise we have a correct detection probability
Pd. Using theorem 3, the actually detection probability













































∑ |hb,m|2+σ2, FTW2(·) is the cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of the Tracy-Widom distri-
bution of order 2 (n = 1, 2), and µn = (N
1/2
s − (M −
n)1/2)2, φn = ((M − n)1/2 − N1/2s )((M − n)−1/2 −
N
−1/2
s )1/3. For a specified Pf , i.e., Pf = 0.1 with
respect to F−1TW2(0.1) = −2.78, the Neyman-Pearson





TW2(Pf ) + µ2σ
2
, (9)
where F−1TW2(·) is the inverse function of Tracy-Widom
distribution FTW2(·).
C. Adaptive Tracking Using Bayesian Forecasting
Because of the channel is time-varying, which makes
the threshold extremely difficult to choice for FC with
time. Fortunately, according to (1) and corollary 1, we
can regard the channel gain
∑ |hb,m|2 at time T − 1
and T approximately as correlated Gaussian variables.
In this case, we adaptively predict the current threshold
recursively based on the past channel gain using Kalman
filter [18], a special case of Bayesian forecasting3. The
channel gain G =∑ |hb,m|2 can be well approached by
an autoregressive of order 1 random process
G(T ) = f(T )G(T − 1) + w(T ), (10)
which represents the state transition equation for the
system, describing the variation of G at time T − 1
and T . Where G(T ) is the state of gain power at
time T , w(T ) is the process noise following zero-mean
Gaussian distribution with variance rw(T ), f(T ) is the
state transition probability. Both f(T ) and w(T ) can
be computed by the set of the Yule-Walker equations
defined as





w(T ) = r(0) − f(T )r(−1), (12)
where the variance is given by r(g) = E[G(T )G(T −
g)] for lag g ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. The channel gain observed
by the receiver at time T is related to the state by the
measurement equation
z(T ) = HG(T ) + v(T ). (13)
3The initialization channel gain is available by means of reverse
training.
Where vector z(T ) represents the observed gain of time
T , v(T ) is the measurement noise following zero-mean
Gaussian distribution with covariance matrix Rv(T ) and
H = [0, f(T )]⊤ is the measurement that maps the state
transition probability into the measurement domain. The
Kalman equation that allow us to recursively calculate
Gˆ(T ) by combining past knowledge, prediction from
system model and noisy measurement. At time T , the re-
ceiver predicts power before receiving the measurement
with the equations
Gˆ(T−) = f(T )Gˆ(T − 1),
M(T−) = HM(T − 1)H⊤ +Rw(T ). (14)
Where M(·) is the state estimation mean square error
matrix of T − 1-th term, and Rw(T ) is the covariance
matrix with respect to rw(T ). After observing the mea-
surement from z(T ), receiver updates the Kalman gain
K(T ) and corrects the state estimate and correlation
coefficient according to the equations
Gˆ(T ) = Gˆ(T−) +K(T )(z(T )−HGˆ(T−)),
M(T ) = [I2 −K(T )H]M(T−), (15)
where K(T ) = M(T−)H⊤[(HM(T−)H⊤Rw(T )]−1.
Then, FC updates the power gain Gˆ(T ) with respect to
the threshold via (14) and (15), recursively.
IV. SIMULATION AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we verify the theory and analyze the
performance of the proposed algorithm by simulation. In
the simulation, we set the number of devices be M = 20,
maximum Doppler frequency fd = 20Hz. Without loss
of generality, we set the large-scale fading coefficients
to be one and the normal transmission power Pb = 1W .
Hence, the signal is transmitted through a multi-path
Rayleigh fading channel. At the receivers, the users send
the signal samples to FC to cooperative detect whether
the active spoofing attack is present or not. Fig. 1 shows
three instances of our proposed time-varying channel
gain tracking algorithm with time in different SNRs. As
shown in the figure, the tracked channel gain is fluctuate
around actual channel gain in each time slot. Moreover,
when the measurement noise increases, the algorithm can
still effectively track the power gain across time through
the recursive update.
Fig. 2 illustrates how the Neyman-Pearson threshold
γ change with the number of samples Ns increasing.
It shows that the threshold γ decreases as the number
of samples increases, and this threshold will converge
w.p.1 to an approximate fixed point no matter what the
noise power is. This is an meaningful insight, which
guides us to stably track the threshold via choosing a
proper sample number. For example, we do not need
to set the sample number Ns to be extremely large,
actually, we can get a good detection performance by
setting it to Ns = 200 or less. Furthermore, the higher
the noise power is, the lower the threshold will be. Next,
we conduct 10000 times of Monte-Carlo simulations and
plot the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves,
in which detection probability are plotted with respect
to the false alarm probability. In Fig. 3, we compare
our method with power spectral density (PSD) method
[5] in an OR role with different parameters, i.e., the
number of devices and spoofer’s power. We find that the
performance of the proposed ETRMT method is better
than PSD method in the same parameters. Both PSD and
ETRMT method’s detection performances are improved
with the increasing of device number and spoofer power.
In particular, we observe that our proposed method has
an apparent performance boost with Ps = 2W for M =
8 than PSD method, which thanks to the compensation
for finite sample number via RMT. Moreover, when the
device number is fixed, we see that a larger transmit
power is, the higher risk the attacker will be detected,
which shows a tradeoff between the transmit power and
the detection probability.






























Fig. 1. The time-varying channel gain tracking using Kalman filter.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced a new type of MAC
spoofing attack and proposed the ETRMT algorithm to
cooperative detect this attack. This approach needs no
prior information about the channel and do not have to
store the genuine user’s PHY-layer fingerprint in the off-
line phase. We used the random matrix theory to analyze
the detection performance of the proposed algorithm
and provided an depth analysis on the behavior of the
maximum and minimum eigenvalue distribution of the
sample covariance matrix. The closed-form expression
of the detection probability, false alarm probability and
the Neyman-Pearson threshold were derived. According
to the channel time-varying, we proposed an adaptive
threshold tracking method. Finally, the simulation results
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Fig. 2. The number of samples vs. threshold with different noise
power.
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Fig. 3. The ROC of PSD-OR [5] vs. the proposed ETRMT.
showed that our proposed algorithm can effectively de-
tect the attacker with a good performance.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Lemma 1: For a Ns sample Wishart random matrix




converges to the Tracy-
Widom distribution of order 2. Where µK = (N
1/2
s −
M1/2)2, and φK = (M
1/2−N1/2s )(M−1/2−N−1/2s )1/3
[17].
Lemma 2: Consider a setting with K signals, if
Ns,M → ∞, with MNs fixed, the rest of the eigenvalue
with respect to noise and (K + 1)-th eigenvalue as
the maximum eigenvalue of this noise Wishart random
matrix [15].
Recall that the minimum eigenvalue of the sample
covariance matrix is denoted as λmin. According to
lemma 2, we get λmin is the minimum eigenvalue of
the Wishart random matrix. Let λ′min =
Ns
σ2 λmin denote
the minimum eigenvalue of the normalized statistical
covariance matrix. Combining lemma 1, we obtain the
theorem 3, and the proof is completed.
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